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effect on our long-term well-being.1 Quite the contrary, this treadmill would 
undermine individuals’ material conditions, self-esteem, quality of life, psycho-
logical balance, and so forth.
To sum up, individuals would be stuck on a treadmill (a status treadmill, a 
hedonistic treadmill, etc.) and its impact would be worsened by the competi-
tive nature of capitalist/market societies. The treadmill tradition is obviously 
a rejoinder to a more ambitious and older critique of capitalist societies and 
their underlying market systems. This critique states that something must be 
wrong about competition, about the distribution of the social product accord-
ing to one’s performance on markets, and so forth.
THE EVOLUTIONARY NECESSITY OF COMPETITION
This broader critique often leads to rejecting en bloc everything about industri-
alized societies, the worst as well as the best. In that respect, it is the merit of 
Rush: Why We Need and Love Rat Race to engage what the author of the book, 
Todd G. Buchholz, calls the ‘edenist’ view, another way of qualifying the tread-
mill critique which advocates for a society where competition would be out of 
the picture. On the contrary, he defends competition for its positive effects on 
the society and individuals. As he sums up the case:
‘It is the race itself—sloppy, risky, and tense—that can bring us happiness. 
It is the very pursuit of love, new knowledge, wealth, and status that liter-
ally delivers the rush, lights up our brains, releases dopamine, and ignites 
our passion. Furthermore, I’m going to argue that the cause and effect be-
tween competition and happiness is hardwired into everyone of us. Some of 
the results will surprise you. Competition makes people more fair, and it also 
makes them taller’ (Buchholz, 2011, pp. 7–8).
In short, competition has allowed humanity to move away from the reign of 
necessity, to develop culturally and materially, and to enjoy better living con-
ditions. Thus, the book is grounded in an evolutionary argument in favor of 
competition: competition renders evolution possible and beneficial for individu-
als. Buchholz declines his argument into four claims.
(1) Any sustainable system (understood broadly to include the individual itself 
as well as groups) implies competition,
1 This is the starting point of the Economics of Happiness movement initiated by the work of Rich-
ard Easterlin forty years ago.
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A common stance nowadays is to denounce the flow of modern society in 
general, and competition in particular. Part of the critique has to do with the 
recent spring in happiness research. According to various authors, compe-
tition would undermine individuals’ well-being through overwork, extreme 
individualistic behavior, quest for status, and so forth (Botton, 2004; Frank, 
1999; Layard, 2005). The thesis derives some factual support from stud-
ies in happiness research that have been substantiating the view that, over 
the last four decades, constant economic growth has not translated into any 
significant increase of life satisfaction (Easterlin 1974). As it seems, despite 
all our material affluence, we cannot help ‘stumbling on happiness’ (Gilbert 
2006).
Part of this critique is inspired by the “treadmill tradition”. In short, com-
petition would foster zero-sum games under the form of rat races where eve-
ryone is always trying to get more (money, prestige, status, recognition, etc.) 
for, in fact, staying at the same place. We would be competing more and more, 
spending more and more for conspicuous consumption without any noticeable 
 – Buchholz – 
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would be the rush of competition that would maintain our cognitive abilities. 
His references are limited to one single study while numerous recent research 
studies have shown the negative effect of stress on biological aging and, for in-
stance, the development of Alzheimer’s disease.
If we leave the question of evidence aside, the biological case for compe-
tition as framed by Buchholz is based on the failure to recognize the norma-
tive salience of the “is-ought” distinction, which is surprising since Buchholz 
identifies such failure in Darwinians like Thomas Huxley or Herbert Spen-
cer (Buchholz, 2011, p. 93). It may then be claimed that Rush’s argument simi-
larly presumes a continuum between naturalistic assumptions and normative 
claims. As a proof, Buchholz often moves back and forth between the empiri-
cal claim regarding the role played by competition in evolution and its norma-
tive justification.
The reason is that Buchholz probably wishes to root his case in the so-
cial benefits of competition. Instead of arguing that ‘competition is good, pe-
riod’, he is committed to convincing the reader that competition is ‘good for X’. 
This reveals a contrast between two sorts of legitimation for market arrange-
ments. One places great emphasis on the intrinsic value of the market. Argu-
ments coined in terms of individual freedom often rely on the intrinsic value 
of the market (and in turn competition). Free markets will be a value-based 
mechanism of human interaction, not so much because they promote individ-
ual freedom but because they incarnate individual freedom. It is because there 
is individual freedom that free markets exist. Then, the ultimate normative 
worth lies not in free markets in proper, but in the underlying liberty.
Buchholz adopts a different strategy. As free markets allow competition 
and as competition produces positive outcomes (to get the best of ourselves 
and to evolve as a species), free markets are justified by their outcomes. In 
other words, the core of Buchholz’s argument is to affirm that when searching 
for the best justifications for certain social practices, one should identify the 
benefits of such practices. The demarche is interesting and Buchholz is right 
to ask his readers to consider the individual and collective gains from compe-
tition. However, his willingness to make a knockdown argument against the 
claim that competition is detrimental leads him to actually endorse a radical 
position – justifying almost any kind of socially beneficial activity by competi-
tion – which undermines his general objective.
One of the major points of Rush is the claim that competition in general 
and market competition in particular favor the expansion of cooperative be-
havior within the society. It would have given humanity the opportunity to 
move away from local solidarity and to start applying schemes of trust and 
cooperation more broadly (Buchholz, 2011, pp. 134, 137, 147). Two critical re-
(2) Eden (a world without competition) is not an option, even if it once existed, 
because we would not fit in it anymore,
(3) Entrepreneurs have not instilled the need to acquire stuff inside people’s 
brains. If they compete, it is not by pure materialism but for self-esteem 
and the perpetuation of genes,
(4) Without competition, ‘most of you reading this book now will be dead’ 
(Buchholz, 2011, p. 22).
Interestingly enough, Rush steps into intense debates about the justifications of 
competition, more particularly capitalist competition, i.e. competition on mar-
kets. In an indirect manner, it also discusses the role of (public) institutions in 
economy and the proper scope and means of regulation. The issue at stake is 
normative and concerns the proper scope of public policy.
When considering the four-step argument from this normative perspective, 
(4) can be immediately discarded because it is not so much an argument in fa-
vor of competition than an affirmation that calls for additional justifications. In 
the same vein, (2) is an empirical claim that needs to be proved. In sciences, a 
difference is made between the context of discovery and the context of valid-
ity. This is not because a specific phenomenon appears under certain circum-
stances that it cannot appear or be reproduced under different circumstances. 
The fact that Eden emerged with a certain type of human agency (if it existed 
one day) or a certain profile of human behavior does not imply that it would 
be incompatible with some other forms of agency or behavior profiles. Then, 
both (1) and (3) remain. Both attribute moral value to competition. Argument 
(1) does so by turning competition into a systemic necessity, while (3) turns it 
into an individual necessity. In other words, competition will be necessary for 
societies and human beings to survive or, at least, to flourish.
COMPETITION AND SOCIAL BENEFITS
However, despite the vibrant take of Rush’s arguments, there are several rea-
sons to resist them, not that much the more general argument about the value 
of competition from an evolutionary point of view but rather the way the ar-
gument in favor of competition is actually coined. In fact the book undermines 
the case it pretends to make for competition and market societies.
First comes the use of scientific evidence, both for empirical and ethi-
cal matters. At various occasions, the evidence mobilized is, at best, too frag-
mented to strengthen Buchholz’s general argument. Just to take one example, 
he claims that being retired makes you stupid (Buchholz, 2011, pp. 115–116). It 
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such as the one defended in Rush have to come up with a solid explanation of 
how competition produces most of its benefits. In other words, a credible ac-
count of the “normative conditions for market efficiency” (Schultz, 2001) is re-
quired. For markets and competition to produce the social benefits they are 
supposed to, some institutional conditions are required, such as a clear, com-
plete and enforced system of property rights. In other words, competitive 
benefits are conditional on a more general system of rules and the existence 
of institutions that impose this system. Sports provide, again, a good analogy. 
If hockey competition produces a pleasant spectacle, it is because the players 
have to follow the formal rules of the game, most notably regarding the degree 
and forms of violence that are acceptable, and their competitive behavior is 
also regulated by some informal rules.
Regarding the first sort of rules, it is where the state usually comes into 
play. Buchholz mentions the importance of this institutional background when 
talking about a ‘legal construct like enforceable contracts’ (Buchholz, 2011, p. 
132). But he fails to notice an immediate implication: free markets and efficient 
competition need an underlying cooperative structure (distinct from competi-
tion itself that abides to different normative principles) that secures the condi-
tions for efficient competition. In countries without rule of law and government 
stability, the kind of competition Buchholz has in mind is difficult to find. Most 
of the time, competition in these countries is only about rent-seeking and 
brute appropriation. Their economic environment looks much more like a 
Hobbesian state of nature than the kind of utopia cherished by libertarians.
In addition to the provision of such conditions, institutions have also a role 
to play ex post, i.e. in the actual functioning of the markets. Because the state 
has the capacity to enact regulation and to coerce individuals, it has the advan-
tage over markets to be capable of curbing unhealthy competition, especially 
by resolving collective action problems that Buchholz never really acknowl-
edges throughout his book. But collective action problems are not incidental. 
They are even the ground on which an author like Robert Frank engages the 
kind of libertarian position defended in Rush (that competition is good all the 
time). In simple terms, it is efficient to have institutions regulating some mar-
kets or to replace markets by other mechanisms of interaction because indi-
viduals get easily trapped into damaging patterns of competition that generate 
suboptimal outcomes.
In summary, by presenting cooperation as stemming from competition, 
Buchholz undermines his point by over-stating it (all or most of the good 
gained from economic development can be attributed to competition). More, 
it may be argued that actually prior cooperation allows beneficial competition, 
which turns Buchholz’ scheme upside down.
marks stem from this affirmation. Firstly, the affirmation of the competitive or-
igin of cooperation is a strong empirical claim that ought to be substantiated. 
Rush does not provide solid evidence in this direction. Secondly, and more im-
portantly, the claim blurs the difference between competition and cooperation, 
which is problematic. Competition and cooperation as notions do not refer to 
the same sort of human interaction. Two tennis players compete with each 
other, they do not cooperate. When a couple cooks, they cooperate, they do not 
compete. Each notion qualifies a specific kind of human interaction.
Furthermore, if some trust has to emerge from competition, in accordance 
with Buchholz’s view, it arguably does so from fair competition. Trust is then 
the result of respecting the rules of the game (defined outside the competitive 
process) while playing in good spirit (the famous “fair play” attitude). Our point 
is that it is difficult to agree that any competition, no matter how it takes place, 
might be socially beneficial in general or good for trust and cooperation in partic-
ular.2 In this instance, it is obvious that trust has more to do with the institutional 
context of competition or agents’ dispositions than with competition per se.
The distinction between competition and cooperation is central for under-
standing and defending a market-based economic system. If market compe-
tition may be good, it is because it favors innovation and drives prices down. 
It is competition that forces Walmart, for instance, to offer low prices, which 
benefits consumers at the end of the day. Society expects precisely this kind of 
behavior from market actors, not cooperation. In capitalist societies, there is 
a term for most of cooperative behavior among competitors, collusion, which 
is usually seen as detrimental to customers. Most countries have enacted anti-
trust regulation precisely because collusion may threaten the gains from com-
petition. This is also why a prominent defender of economic liberalism like 
Milton Friedman held the view that corporations were one of the main ene-
mies of markets (and competition). It illustrates that the two notions – cooper-
ation and competition – are distinct on both conceptual and practical grounds. 
They allude to different ways to organize economic interaction.
THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF COMPETITION
This assimilation of competition to cooperation has a further consequence. It 
leads Buchholz to neglect the institutional conditions for competition. Positions 
2 ‘Making a profit is the goal of business, in the same way that winning is the goal of competitive 
sport. But the point is not to achieve this goal by any means possible; it is to achieve it in a fair 
and honest way’ (Heath, 2006a, p. 369).
REVIEW – Buchholz – Rush: Why We Need and Love the Rat Race – Landes
72 73
Central European Journal of Public Policy – Vol. 6 – № 1 – June 2012
of markets, the case would have been settled a long time ago. Now, in a context 
where markets can fail (and regularly do) and where various forms of coopera-
tive (understood: non-competitive) mechanisms produce social goods more ef-
ficiently, the right discussion bears on the usefulness of competition and the 
proper boundaries to set for maximizing its benefits. These issues are far more 
interesting, especially from a public policy point of view.
After recognizing what could be expected from competition and in what 
extent, we have a firmer grip on what we may call the “social function” of com-
petition, i.e. its benefits and the conditions (including limitations) under which 
it can produce them. This reflection is much more fruitful than the either-or 
case flaw, for or against competition, that Rush shares with the edenist view. 
While the latter tends to discard competition even in fields where it may pro-
duce a net social benefit, the book dismisses by principle any form of human 
interaction, including cooperation, that could take place outside of markets and 
is unrelated to competition.
The limit of the argument is best expressed when Buchholz affirms that 
‘[o]ur drive to compete does not force us, therefore, only into zero-sum games 
against other people. Nor is happiness a zero-sum game. You don’t steal joy 
from other people, any more than you steal good health. You share your bless-
ings’ (Buchholz, 2011, p. 242). Central for interpreting this passage is the im-
portance to be attributed to the adverb ‘only’. Buchholz is right when he says 
that competition does not drive us only into collective action problems. It does 
not mean that competition never drives us into zero-sum games. As a matter of 
facts, competition often does. His analysis is partial when he tunes down the 
extent of collective action problems: individuals do steal joy from other peo-
ple, as suggested by the “relative income hypothesis” (Duesenberry, 1949). 
Research in experimental psychology and economics offers uncountable illus-
trations of this phenomenon.
More and as shown by the British epidemiologist Michael Marmot, if in-
dividuals do not steal health from each other, they may impair each other’s 
health through a status effect, i.e. their position in the hierarchy (Marmot, 
2004). The sensitivity of Rush to complexity in the domain of knowledge 
(Buchholz, 2011, p. 159) does not unfortunately translate into a sensitivity to 
complexity that has to do with context-sensitive and strategic behavior. The 
latter is of prime importance when one discusses the merits of markets and 
the role institutions play through public policy. This lack is a major weakness 
of the book.
In spite of the precedent reservations, Rush still has the merit to engage 
the essential issue of justifications for markets in capitalist societies. Buchholz 
rightly identifies the rejection of competition as a whole in recent literature 
Without a shadow of a doubt, competition has played an important part in 
human development. Competition may be good, but not all the time and under 
any circumstance. Other actors and forms of human interaction have rendered 
possible human development. Among these actors, the state holds an eminent 
place. Historically, it has played an essential role in educating workforce, pro-
viding insurance (especially social insurance), and setting norms and regu-
lations fostering the rise of markets. The reason for such involvement is that 
the state is more efficient than markets in providing very important goods and 
services. It is not only about public goods, but also risk management (Moss, 
2002).
The mention of risk here is far from being anodyne for at least two rea-
sons. On the one hand, insurance is not the same mechanism than competition 
(Heath, 2006b). When people pool their resources to face risks, they do not 
compete with each other. They enter in a mutual coverage plan. The benefit of 
insurance (reduced uncertainty in regard to future losses and one’s capacity to 
cope with them) does not result from competition, but from the Law of Large 
Numbers. On the other hand, the state has been a key actor in the spread of in-
surance, and not only social insurance. Its role has often been socially benefi-
cial and it helps to the development of the industry.
An example is the requirement to insure work accidents. It liberated en-
trepreneurs, taken individually, from their own material responsibility regard-
ing accidents in their factory (Ewald, 1986), thus reducing their risk aversion, 
by pooling the losses. They became more prone to undertake risky, but pro-
ductive, activities, which were, ultimately, beneficial for economic development 
and the overall community. The development of insurance of this kind imposed 
by the state was efficient. In that respect, it is surprising to observe that Buch-
holz blames the increased culture of safety, the principle of bailing out people 
who fail and high risk aversion (Buchholz, 2011, pp. 227–228), when such it has 
obviously favored the rise of markets and the development of competition. In 
multiple occasions, the mechanism of bailing out through insurance has been 
employed to favor trade and industry. The explanation for Buchholz’s criticism 
may have to do with the fact that insurance mechanisms are not based on com-
petition, which is additional evidence of the reductive scope of Rush’s thesis.
CONCLUSION: THE PROPER SCOPE OF COMPETITION
Rush illustrates that competition, its conditions and limits is a highly normative 
issue. If the choice were for or against competition, it would be a poor discus-
sion. Moreover, if all the proofs, everywhere and for everything, were in favor 
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(especially on status seeking and happiness) as a naïve stance. Competition 
and markets may be beneficial, and the book’ strength is in placing the debate 
under the light of social benefits. However, one may find the argument globally 
unconvincing due to the partial view offered on the dynamics of competition 
and due to the lack of concern for the part institutions and public policy can 
play in the efficiency of the overall economic structure.
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